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Abstract 
This paper examines empirically the announcement effect of commercial corporate governance 
ratings on share returns. Rating downgrades by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) are 
associated with negative returns of –1.14% over a 3-day announcement window. The returns 
are highly correlated with the proprietary analysis of ISS and are decreasing in agency costs, 
consistent with ratings providing independent information on underlying corporate governance 
quality. We thus show that the influence and impact of ISS extends beyond proxy 
recommendations and subsequent voting outcomes. Our findings contrast with the insignificant 
price impact of Daines, Gow, and Larcker (2010), whose analysis we replicate and 
successfully reconcile to ours by pooling upgrades and downgrades together. 
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Over the past 20 years, corporate governance analyst firms (“governance analysts”) have 
emerged as important information intermediaries. These firms provide an array of services 
including data, analysis, ratings, proxy recommendations, and consulting. Firms such as 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) arguably wield considerable influence over firm 
governance choices and investor decisions. Research on governance analysts has 
predominantly focused on proxy recommendations. Our understanding of the determinants and 
effects of the other services provided by these firms is limited. 
Our objective is to establish whether corporate governance ratings (“governance ratings”), 
one of the primary services provided by governance analysts, are price-relevant for security 
markets. Understanding the importance to the market of the information provided by 
governance analysts is key to understanding how influential they actually are. We examine the 
announcement effect of rating changes on the stock returns of U.S. firms. Ratings distill a wide 
range of publicly available governance metrics and discretionary judgement into a singular 
summary measure of governance quality. There is anecdotal evidence that investors find ratings 
useful. In 2016 for example, Ides Capital Management pressured Boingo to improve its 
governance on the basis of the ISS rating: “Our perspective is shaped…by the dismal 
governance scores that the Company receives from ISS. We believe that the decision by 
ISS…to assign to Boingo a Governance Quickscore rating of 7…speaks volumes in terms of 
the Company's “higher risk” corporate governance practices.” 
Despite such anecdotal evidence (additional examples provided in Appendix Table A1) 
considerable skepticism has been expressed about the construct validity of the ratings and 
whether they accurately measure governance quality (e.g., Larcker et al., 2007; Rose, 2007; 
Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Bhagat et al., 2008; Black et al., 2014). Some commentators argue 




that market participants purchase the ratings just to obtain the underlying governance data (e.g., 
Rose, 2007; Calomiris and Mason, 2010).  
Several studies find that rating levels have low power to predict future long run 
performance (e.g., Bhagat et al., 2008; Daines et al., 2010 (“DGL”)). DGL also conclude that 
ratings are not useful in predicting accounting restatements or future class action lawsuits. One 
problem with testing for long run outcomes is the noise caused by their many determinants, 
which may make it hard to detect a relationship even if it exists. The advantage of event study 
analysis is that many of these factors are not at play, thus making it the most informative 
approach to assess the importance of ratings. The only event study to date (DGL) tests for a 
linear relation between all rating changes (i.e., upgrades and downgrades) and returns, for four 
governance analyst firms including ISS, and concludes that rating announcements do not 
impact stock prices. Thus rating information content may not be important, perhaps because it 
lags information from other sources.  
We revisit this question, focusing our main analysis on 18,911 rating change 
announcements by ISS, the most influential (and sole surviving governance focused) rating 
firm in the U.S. over the past 20 years. Whilst our event study approach avoids the noise of 
long run studies and largely addresses issues of causality, the reliability of our results may be 
weakened by contaminating events, incorrect counterfactuals, cross-correlation caused by 
event clustering, and incorrect announcement windows (e.g., de Jong and Naumovska, 2016). 
We pay careful attention to these issues, removing confounding events, employing different 
counterfactuals, multiple event windows, and controlling for cross-correlation.  
Critically, we also draw a distinction between rating upgrades and downgrades. We are 
motivated to do so by the presence of asymmetric announcement price effects in the credit 
rating (e.g., Ederington and Goh, 1998) and analyst forecast revision (e.g., Frankel et al., 2006) 
literatures. In our context, announcement price effects may occur for downgrades but not 




upgrades for at least three reasons. First, upgrades may impact prices prior to announcement 
because rumours of upgrades are more likely to be traded on due to potential feedback effects 
of downgrades (e.g., Edmans et al., 2015) and short selling constraints.1 Second, some 
institutional investors may sell following downgrades due to investor mandates/self‐imposed 
rules to not hold poorly governed firms, but not buy following upgrades. Third, investors may 
view upgrades as less credible than downgrades due to conflicts of interest arising from 
provision of consulting services to rated firms (Rose, 2007; Calomiris and Mason, 2010; Li, 
2018).  
We find that rating downgrades are associated with large negative stock returns which are 
increasing in downgrade magnitude. For large downgrades the negative returns are –1.14% 
over a 3-day announcement window. Upgrades do not result in a significant market reaction. 
Our key conclusion that ratings contain price-relevant information contrasts with the 
insignificant price impact documented by DGL. We replicate DGL’s analysis, and 
successfully reconcile their findings to ours by pooling upgrades and downgrades together. 
However, when we differentiate upgrades from downgrades, we get different results from 
DGL. It is important to note that in the DGL study and our replication of it, the analysis extends 
to other governance analysts including Audit Integrity, Governance Metrics International, and 
The Corporate Library as well as ISS. Thus our replication demonstrates that our relevance and 
asymmetric effect results are not just specific to ISS, but apply to other governance analysts. 
We examine whether the information content reflects the underlying corporate governance 
quality of the firm, as claimed by ISS. If so, and the market believes that weaker (stronger) 
                                                          
1 There is anecdotal evidence of ISS rated firms announcing upgrades prior to public announcement. 
For example, on June 20 2014, Abercrombie and Fitch announced a higher ISS rating, 11 days before 
the public announcement on Bloomberg. This is consistent with firms releasing good (but not bad) 
news early (e.g., Hong et al., 2000). However, we search on Factiva and find only 8 cases where ISS 
rated firms announced upgrades prior to public announcement, of which none are in our final dataset.  




governance has a negative (positive) effect on subsequent firm performance, a downgrade 
(upgrade) should result in lower (higher) firm value. Our governance quality hypothesis 
predicts that downgrade (upgrade) returns are more negative (positive) where potential agency 
costs are higher, since the cost of weaker governance is higher in such firms. We measure 
agency costs in line with Jensen (1986): cash flow provides greater scope for wasteful spending 
through negative NPV projects; growth opportunities (proxied by market-to-book value) 
reduce such problems since investment generally adds value; leverage constrains 
management’s ability to waste resources. Separately, our downside risk hypothesis suggests 
that stronger governance may decrease the likelihood of very bad outcomes, but not improve 
the likelihood of very good outcomes.2 Downgrade (upgrade) returns should thus be more 
negative (positive) where firms have higher downside risk, which we proxy with higher 
volatility and leverage (e.g., Hoepner et al., 2018).3, 4  We find lower returns for downgraded 
firms with higher cash flow, lower growth opportunities, and lower leverage, supportive of the 
governance quality hypothesis.  
To conclude that downgrades are price informative, it is important to understand why 
upgrades are not. We test three explanations for asymmetric price effects, but none is strongly 
                                                          
2 Hoepner et al. (2018) show that shareholder engagement on governance (as well as ESG more 
generally) provides protection against downside risk, whilst Lins et al. (2017) find that high CSR 
firms have higher returns during the financial crisis. 
3 The proxies employed (although widely used) are imperfect and could work in the opposite direction 
to that hypothesized. For example, where growth opportunities are high, the potential value loss from 
pursuing the quiet life is high, thus agency costs could be greater since a CEO’s actions have more 
effect on firm value.  
4 Downside risk effects do not predict the asymmetric upgrade/downgrade effect we observe since 
upgrades should reduce downside risk and downgrades increase it. In the context of CSR, Krüger 
(2015) finds significantly negative returns to negative CSR events but no positive returns to positive 
events. However, this asymmetric effect appears to be driven by positive CSR events being the result 
of agency costs, which is not the case for corporate governance upgrades. 




supported by the data. First, we find no significant pre-announcement abnormal returns for 
upgrades and thus no evidence that upgrades impact prices prior to announcement. Second, if 
institutional investors sell following downgrades, such institutional friction could push prices 
down in the short run and subsequently revert, whilst returns should negatively correlate with 
institutional investor presence. However, we find no evidence of either. Third, we find no 
evidence of positive returns to upgrades for smaller firms which are less likely to be ISS 
consulting clients (Li, 2018), or for The Corporate Library which did not provide consulting 
services.  
We investigate whether the information content of ISS downgrade announcements 
contains proprietary analysis and thus independent information content. Alternatively, 
investors may underreact to individual prior changes in governance data, and summary rating 
changes may merely draw users to look at previously available governance data more closely 
(see, e.g., Gilbert et al. (2012) in the context of summary macroeconomic data). To distinguish 
between these possibilities, we disentangle governance rating changes from governance 
changes using the underlying governance inputs that ISS uses for its rating estimation. We 
show that returns are significantly negative for downgrades with no associated governance 
changes, and that proprietary information content is an important determinant of negative 
returns. These findings suggest that downgrades contain independent information content.  
We explore, and refute, another explanation for the negative returns related to potential 
real effects of downgrades. Downgrades may increase the likelihood that ISS will recommend 
a proxy advisory vote against management, which adversely affect voting outcomes (Iliev and 
Lowry, 2015; Malenko and Shen, 2016; McCahery et al., 2016) and stock prices (Ertimur et 
al., 2013; Hitz and Lehmann, 2018). However, we find that the correlation between 
downgrades and subsequent proxy recommendations against management is small (as do 
DGL), and that the negative returns are not driven by downgrades that occur closer to the proxy 




season. This explanation is also rendered less plausible by our DGL replication which shows 
negative returns hold for other governance analysts which do not provide proxy advisory 
services.  
Our key finding and conclusion is that a relatively new type of intermediary that conveys 
summary information on corporate governance is highly relevant for financial markets. Thus 
at a broad level, we extend understanding of which information intermediaries are price 
informative (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010). We inform the debate on the 
value of governance information (e.g., Calluzzo and Dudley, 2019; Iliev et al., 2019; Malenko 
and Malenko, 2019) by demonstrating its high value to market participants. Our finding of a 
price impact extends the prior evidence on governance ratings which shows that their 
introduction increases the dissemination of governance information (Lehmann, 2019). 
Additionally, our key finding supports Bebchuk et al.’s (2013) claim that immediate price 
reactions may explain the disappearing relation between academic summary governance 
measures and future returns, thus contributing to this literature (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; 
Bebchuk et al., 2009). 
Our findings are relevant to the ongoing regulatory debate on proxy advisory firms within 
Congress (Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act of 2017), the SEC 
(Roundtable on the Proxy Process, 2018), and European Union (EU Shareholder Rights 
Directive). This debate has focused exclusively on proxy recommendations, which have been 
shown to determine prices and voting outcomes (e.g., Alexander et al., 2010; Ertimur et al., 
2013; Hitz and Lehmann, 2018). By showing that proxy advisory firms also impact prices via 
rating announcements, and thus the dissemination of governance information, we demonstrate 
a greater influence and importance than previously assumed.  
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Governance Ratings 




ISS produced three ratings between 2002–2016: Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) 
(2002–2010); Governance Risk Indicator (GRID) (2011–2013); and Quickscore (QS) (2013–
2016). Each rating is constructed according to whether certain conditions are met for a set of 
governance variables which are publicly disclosed by ISS. A score is allocated to each 
outcome, each variable is weighted, summed, and discretionary adjustments applied. We do 
not include GRID in our analysis because it has no overall score but instead three sub-category 
ratings, and announcement effects may be confounded by multiple sub-category effects. CGQ 
has two relative ratings: CGQ Industry (relative to US firms in same industry) and CGQ Index 
(relative to firms in same index).5 QS is measured relative to index firms only. We combine 
CGQ and QS, employing CGQ Index (rather than CGQ Industry) for comparability with QS.  
For the replication, we examine the same ratings, methodology and time period as DGL. 
Thus we examine CGQ Industry for 2005–2007; Audit Integrity’s AGR rating for 2002–2007; 
Governance Metrics International’s GMI rating for 2005–2007; and The Corporate Library’s 
TCL rating for 2003–2006. GMI and TCL are primarily governance ratings whilst AGR 
includes some governance but mainly accounting measures. Table 1 describes key 
characteristics of the sample ratings.6 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
2.2 Rating Announcements   
                                                          
5 Rating changes may be caused by changes in index rather than focal firms, although such changes are 
likely to be small given the large indexes. 
6 In 2010, Governance Metrics International, Audit Integrity, and The Corporate Library merged to 
form GMI Ratings. Following the merger, AGR continued in existence whilst GMI and TCL were 
discontinued and replaced by a new rating, GMI Analyst, which incorporates environmental and 
social measures and is not available on Bloomberg.  GMI Ratings was acquired by MSCI in 2014, 
and GMI Analyst was subsequently integrated into MSCI’s ESG rating measure. 




The public announcement of ISS ratings occurs on the first trading day of each month via both 
Bloomberg and Yahoo Finance. The ratings are systematically announced regardless of 
whether the ratings change or not. The ratings were updated in May, November, and during 
proxy season until January 2014, after which more frequent monthly updates were introduced. 
During proxy season, ratings are announced to rated firms and to institutional shareholder 
clients via the ISS proxy report and recommendation, the date for which is not publicly 
available. In addition to potential information leakage, the recommendation is a contaminating 
event generating abnormal returns (Ertimur et al., 2013). We therefore exclude Bloomberg 
announcements during a firm’s proxy season. The announcements for AGR, GMI, and TCL 
are made on Bloomberg. GMI announcements occur regularly at quarter end, whilst AGR and 
TCL announcements are irregular. Bloomberg is our source for ratings and announcement 
dates.  
2.3 Sample Selection 
We sample all rating announcements for which there is a change between the current and prior 
rating level. We retain small changes which, although introducing noise, provide a 
counterfactual for larger changes. To minimize the possibility of returns being contaminated 
by confounding events (see, e.g., de Jong and Naumovska, 2016) we exclude rating change 
observations as follows: CGQ Index changes with a simultaneous opposite change in CGQ 
Industry; corporate announcements (M&A (data from Thomson One); earnings, dividends, 
analyst recommendations, analyst forecasts, credit rating changes (data from IBES); 
management and board changes (data from BoardEx)) made 10 days either side of 
announcement; rating changes preceded in previous 30 trading days by another rating firm’s 
change; less than 70 observations in the estimation period; and stock price less than $1. For the 
replication, we first report results prior to these exclusions to ensure consistency with DGL. 
Our replication sample is very similar to that of DGL (Appendix Table A2).  It includes three 




GMI changes of –93, –90.5, and 16, for which the underlying Bloomberg data is incorrect since 
GMI follows a 1–10 scale. Table 2 reports the number of exclusions.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
2.4 Event Study Methodology  
We estimate the daily cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR) for an event window of 3 [–1, 
+1] days around the announcement date [0]. We use a market model, using the CRSP value-
weighted index, and an estimation period of days –270 to –21. Because our announcements are 
clustered by date (i.e., monthly for ISS, quarterly for GMI), we address potential bias from 
cross-sectional correlation. For univariate analysis, we estimate standard errors using the 
approach of Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) which controls for both event-induced volatility 
change and cross-sectional correlation, and the nonparametric sign test of Cowan (1992). For 
regression analysis, we cluster standard errors by event date and firm (Petersen, 2009). Where 
the number of clusters is insufficient to avoid potential bias (i.e., ≤ 20), we use a wild cluster 
bootstrap-t procedure (Cameron et al., 2008).  
2.5 Independent Variables  
The Upgrade and Downgrade variables measure rating change magnitude for changes that 
improve or deteriorate respectively. They are in absolute terms, comprising positive values 
only, with larger values indicating larger upgrades and downgrades. To make CGQ rating 
changes comparable with QS changes (CGQ has a 0–100 range, QS 1–10), we divide CGQ 
changes by 10. Thus a change of 1 unit can be interpreted as a 10% change. For the replication 
analysis, the ratings have different ranges with implications for coefficient interpretation. AGR 
ranges from 0–100, GMI from 1–10, and TCL from 1–5. The variable Rating change measures 
rating change magnitude, including negative values for downgrades and positive values for 
upgrades. 




For our cross-sectional analysis our firm level variables are defined as follows. Free cash 
flow is operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses, income taxes, and capital 
expenditures, scaled by total assets. MTB is market value of assets over total assets. Leverage 
is total liabilities scaled by total assets. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns 
in the year before rating change. Size is market capitalization ($ million) at calendar year-end. 
Accounting data is from Compustat and share price data from CRSP. Institutional ownership 
is shares held by institutional investors to total shares outstanding, from Thomson Reuters 
CDA/Spectrum database. When missing, institutional ownership is set equal to zero.  
To test the information content of ISS rating changes, we employ the inputs used to 
construct CGQ and QS, obtained from ISS. The input data is annual for CGQ, daily for QS. To 
test for independent content, we estimate whether, over the prior 12 months, there is a change 
in any governance inputs. We examine returns for firms with no change in governance inputs 
(No prior change in governance) vis-à-vis firms that have at least one change (Prior change in 
governance). To measure proprietary information content, we require monthly data and thus 
use the QS rating. For each month, we assign a value of 1 (0) for each input based on whether 
it meets (does not meet) the ISS criteria. We exclude inputs that ISS states publicly have a zero 
weighting. Public content is the monthly change in the sum of these values, and captures 
whether the market reacts belatedly to prior governance changes. Weighted content is the fitted 
value of the regression of monthly rating change on the monthly changes in individual 
governance inputs, and measures the proprietary weights that ISS attaches to each governance 
variable.  Discretionary content is the residual from this regression, and captures any additional 
discretionary adjustments made by ISS. Summary statistics are shown in Table 3. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
3. Results 
3.1 ISS Rating Changes and Announcement Returns 




We begin by presenting our event study analysis of ISS upgrades and downgrades. Panel A of 
Table 4 reports mean and median CAR for the 3-day window surrounding announcements. 
Upgrades are associated with statistically and economically insignificant returns. In contrast, 
the returns to downgrades are significantly negative, economically meaningful and more 
negative for larger downgrades. The mean (median) CAR for rating downgrades of ≥1, >1, and 
>2 are –0.26%, –0.70%, and –1.14% (–0.26%, –0.45%, and –0.77%), and statistically 
significant. Including small downgrades of less than one results in insignificant returns, likely 
due to their lower information content.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Panel B reports regression analysis of CAR on Upgrade and Downgrade for the samples of 
upgrades and downgrades, respectively. We present results both with and without year and 
industry effects, and for all rating changes as well as those >1. The coefficient for Upgrade is 
small and insignificant. However, the Downgrade coefficient is statistically and economically 
significant, robust to year and industry effects. For the regression including all downgrades and 
year and industry effects, the coefficient implies that a one unit downgrade is associated with 
returns that are –0.47% lower.  
The non-linear relationship between returns and rating changes is demonstrated in Figure 1, 
a non-parametric characterization in the form of a plot using local polynomial smoothing. The 
negative effect of downgrade size on returns commences at small downgrades, and increases 
in magnitude for larger downgrades (at around 3). For upgrades, in contrast, there is no relation 
between upgrade size and returns for upgrades between zero and 4. For very large upgrades, 
there is a positive relation but it is much weaker than the negative relation for large downgrades.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
This conclusion is not altered by examining a longer window around announcements. Figure 
2 exhibits returns over an extended period [–10, +10] for large upgrades and downgrades (i.e., 




>2 and <2).7  The CAR for upgrades trends upwards over days –7 to –4, and is an economically 
meaningful 0.81% over [–10, –3]. However, the return is not statistically significant, does not 
hold for the median (–0.03%), and reverts by day +10.   This pattern suggests the asymmetric 
announcement effect is not due to positive pre-announcement price effects for upgrades.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
For large downgrades, the CAR turns negative on day –2, possibly indicating information 
leakage. As noted above, ISS may release the ratings early to rated firms, and thus downgrade 
information may leak to the market (although we have no anecdotal evidence of this). The CAR 
of –0.49 from day –4 to day –1 is however statistically insignificant, and much smaller than 
the CAR of –1.15% on day 0. After the downgrade announcement, the CAR continues to 
decline. Again however, the CAR of –0.47% (mean and median) from day +3 to +10 is not 
statistically significant and much smaller than the CAR on day 0, giving us some confidence 
that the event dates are not mis-measured. One possible explanation is that the market exhibits 
some behavioral bias that causes an initial under-reaction to downgrades. The post-
announcement pattern suggests that the asymmetric price effect is not the result of forced 
selling by institutional investors resulting in temporary downward price pressure around 
downgrades with subsequent share price reversal.8 
3.2 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Announcement Returns 
In this section we report regression analysis of announcement returns on firm characteristics. 
We include a number of independent variables to test the governance quality hypothesis, 
downside risk hypothesis, and two explanations for the asymmetric price effect (in addition to 
                                                          
7 We conduct a range of additional robustness tests in section 3.6 below. 
8 We also examine downgrade CAR over longer windows of [–1, +20] and [–1, +100]. The mean 
(median) returns are –2.64% (–1.25%) for [–1, +20] and –8.81% (–5.20%) for [–1, +100]. Thus our 
conclusion of no reversal holds. 




the pre-announcement patterns just studied). The governance quality hypothesis predicts that 
downgrade returns are more negative where potential agency costs (in line with Jensen (1986)) 
are higher and thus for downgrades predicts: a negative coefficient for Free cash flow which 
provides greater scope for wasteful spending; a positive coefficient for MTB which proxies for 
growth opportunities which reduce such problems since investment generally adds value; a 
positive coefficient for Leverage which constrains management’s ability to waste resources. 
For upgrades, the predicted coefficients are reversed. The downside risk hypothesis predicts 
that weaker (stronger) governance will have a more negative (positive) impact where firm risk 
is greater (lower). Thus for downgrades (upgrades), it predicts negative (positive) coefficients 
for Leverage and Volatility.  
To test whether the asymmetric price effect is driven by upgrade returns being muted due 
to conflict of interest concerns surrounding ISS client firms, we examine the impact of firm 
size. Larger firms are more likely to be clients and thus this explanation predicts a negative 
coefficient on Size for upgrade returns. Downgrades are more likely than upgrades to be 
credible, irrespective of whether the downgraded firm is a client or not, and thus this 
explanation does not predict a comparable size effect for downgrades. To test whether the 
asymmetric price effect is driven by institutional investors being forced to sell following 
downgrades we include Institutional ownership. This explanation predicts a negative effect of 
Institutional ownership on downgrade returns but no comparable effect for upgrades since 
institutional investors would not be not forced to buy following upgrades. 
The results are reported in Table 5. The estimated coefficient for Free cash flow is 
consistently negative in the downgrade regressions. For downgrades >1 the coefficient is 
statistically and economically significant, an increase of one standard deviation being 
associated with –0.47% (–2.14*0.22) lower returns. The coefficient for MTB is significantly 
positive for large downgrades, an increase of one standard deviation being associated with –




0.16% (0.026*6) lower returns. The coefficient for Leverage is positive although not 
statistically significant. These results are consistent with the market interpreting downgrades 
as signaling weaker governance which is expected to destroy more value where potential 
agency costs are higher. Thus our downgrade results are consistent with the governance quality 
hypothesis. For upgrades (>1), the coefficient for Leverage is negative and statistically 
significant, whilst the coefficients for Free cash flow and MTB are the same sign as the 
downgrade regressions but smaller and statistically insignificant. Overall therefore, upgrades 
do not create more value when agency costs are higher, inconsistent with the governance 
quality hypothesis. 
The estimated coefficient for Volatility is significantly negative in the downgrade (>1) 
regressions. Whilst this finding is supportive of the downside risk hypothesis, the positive 
coefficient for Leverage is not. Thus our downgrade results are not supportive of the downside 
risk hypothesis. The same conclusion holds for upgrades, where we observe a small 
insignificant coefficient for Volatility and a significantly negative coefficient for Leverage, 
rather than the hypothesised positive effect. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
   The estimated coefficient on the natural logarithm of Size is small and statistically 
insignificant for the upgrade regressions, and we therefore find no evidence that larger firms 
experience lower upgrade returns. This goes against the hypothesis that the muted effect of 
upgrades on returns is due to the market being skeptical about upgrades for consulting clients 
of ISS, which we proxy by Size.  
The estimated coefficient for Institutional ownership is positive for large downgrades (>1). 
The coefficient is statistically insignificant but economically substantial; a one standard 
deviation increase (35.24%) in ownership is associated with 0.35% (0.01*35.24) higher returns 
which largely mitigate the negative return. This finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis that 




the asymmetric price effect is driven by institutional investors being forced to sell following 
downgrades.9 The results are instead consistent with large institutional shareholders offsetting 
weaker governance via monitoring.  
3.3 Replication of DGL  
We replicate DGL to reconcile their conclusion of an insignificant price impact to our findings. 
Whereas our analysis thus far has examined the ISS rating only, we now follow DGL and 
include four different ratings including ISS. Table 6 Panel B shows that regressing returns on 
rating changes (upgrades and downgrades combined as in DGL) for the replication sample 
produces very similar results to DGL (reported in Panel A). The eight coefficients are of the 
same sign, magnitude and significance. The coefficient for the CGQ Industry sample (using 
size-adjusted returns) is statistically significant but economically small (0.01) implying that a 
10 unit (i.e., 10%) downgrade results in –0.10% lower returns, substantially lower than the –
0.37% decrease reported in Section 3.1. The coefficients for the GMI rating sample are 
negative, thus the opposite sign to that expected, whilst other coefficients are insignificant.  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
Panel C of Table 6 reports replication results after removal of contaminating events. The 
removal reduces sample sizes considerably, by 80% for CGQ/TCL, and 95% for GMI. The 
small sample size for GMI mean the test likely has no statistical power (the standard errors 
increase by an order of magnitude). The coefficients for CGQ Industry and TCL are close to 
zero and insignificant. However, we now observe a statistically significant linear relationship 
between CAR and the AGR rating change. Thus, DGL did not find a linear relationship for one 
rating measure because contaminating effects concurrent with upgrades/downgrades mask this 
                                                          
9 We further ascertain this by finding large negative announcement returns where Institutional 
ownership is equal to zero. 




relationship, and excluding the contaminating events is enough to overturn their conclusion for 
this rating.  
In Table 7 we report separate analyses for upgrades and downgrades. We additionally 
employ the methodology from our main analysis (market- and Fama-French-Cahart four-factor 
models; standard errors clustered on event date and firm; wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure 
when the number of event dates is < 20), although our conclusions are not dependent upon this. 
Panel A reports results prior to removal of contaminating events, although we remove the three 
incorrect observations for GMI. For upgrades the Rating change coefficient is small and 
insignificant. In contrast, the coefficient for downgrades is significantly negative and of large 
economic magnitude for CGQ Industry and TCL. The coefficient for CGQ Industry of –0.03 
(using market-adjusted returns) implies that a 10 unit (10%) downgrade results in a –0.3% 
decrease in returns, similar to that reported for CGQ Index in Section 3.1. For TCL, a one unit 
(20%) downgrade is associated with –0.89% lower returns. The coefficients for GMI 
downgrades are of the expected negative sign and economically large although not statistically 
significant.10  
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
Panel B of Table 7 removes confounding events. The significant negative relation between 
downgrade size and returns continues to hold for CGQ Industry and TCL. The coefficient for 
GML downgrades is no longer negative although small sample size makes inference difficult. 
The coefficients for AGR upgrades and downgrades are statistically and economically 
significant, consistent with the linear relation documented in Table 6 Panel C.11  
                                                          
10 Appendix Table A3 shows our replication results are similar to DGL when using their other event 
windows of [–2, +2] and [prior rating, +1]. The latter has a maximum length of 2,100 days and is 
therefore likely contaminated by confounding events.  
11 AGR also classifies firm scores into risk categories: Very aggressive (bottom 10%); Aggressive (next 
25%); Average (next 50%); and Conservative (top 15%). We examine changes that move across 




Summarizing, our findings are reconciled with DGL by pooling upgrades and downgrades 
together. However, when we differentiate upgrades from downgrades, we get different results 
from DGL. We demonstrate a significant negative relation between downgrade and CAR for 
two of four ratings (CGQ Industry and TCL), whilst for a third measure (GMI) the negative 
relation is economically important. When we additionally remove contaminating events, a 
significant linear relation is found for AGR. We conclude that rating downgrades, but not 
upgrades (with the exception of AGR), do have information content. Since negative downgrade 
effects are not specific to ISS, they are unlikely driven by factors specific to ISS’s business 
model (i.e., proxy recommendations).  
3.4 Informational Content of Downgrades 
In this Section we investigate whether the information content of ISS downgrade 
announcements contains proprietary analysis and thus independent information content. 
Firstly, we report returns for firms with and without prior changes in governance in Table 8. 
Panel A shows significantly negative returns for both types of firm. For firms with no prior 
change, the mean (median) CAR for downgrades of ≥1, >1, and >2 are a statistically significant 
–0.49%, –1.08%, and –1.44% (–0.41%, –0.49%, and –0.50%), respectively. Panel B shows 
that the Downgrade coefficient for these firms is statistically and economically significant, a 
downgrade of 1 being associated with –0.58% lower returns. These findings suggest that 
downgrades contain independent price-relevant information. 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
Table 9 reports the regression of downgrade CAR on: Public content which captures 
whether the market reacts belatedly to prior governance changes; Weighted content which 
                                                          
categories, since the market may interpret them as more significant. The results (Appendix Table A4) 
show that the coefficients for downgrades are significant for two of the four regressions, whilst 
coefficients for upgrades are insignificant. 




measures the proprietary weights that ISS attaches to each governance variable; and 
Discretionary content which captures any additional discretionary adjustments made by ISS. 
The coefficient for Public content is a statistically significant –0.10 (column 2). This suggests 
downgrades draw users to look more closely at previously available governance information, 
and thus evidence of investors underreacting to prior governance changes. However, the 
economic magnitude is small. The coefficient implies that a one standard deviation increase is 
associated with –0.13% (–0.10*1.31) lower returns. The coefficient for Weighted content is 
statistically insignificant and thus the proprietary weighting element of ISS downgrades does 
not appear to contain price relevant information. The coefficient for Discretionary content is 
statistically and economically significant. The coefficient of –0.52 (column 2) implies that a 
one standard deviation increase is associated with –0.37% (–0.52*0.72) lower returns. In sum, 
the price reaction to downgrades stems from drawing attention to existing public information 
and proprietary information on discretionary adjustments.  
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
3.5 Alternative Explanation for the Negative Downgrade Returns  
An alternative explanation for the negative CAR is that downgrades incur real costs such as 
higher likelihood of an ISS proxy recommendation against management. We have partially 
addressed this by showing that the negative reaction occurs for governance analysts that don’t 
give proxy recommendations. In addition, we report returns for downgrades in the quarter prior 
to proxy season and the three prior quarters since the previous AGM. There is presumably less 
time for firms to rectify downgrades occurring closer to the season, and therefore this 
explanation predicts more negative returns for the quarter prior. The results (Appendix Table 
A5) show however that returns are broadly comparable for both periods.  
Next, we examine the extent to which rating downgrades and subsequent proxy 
recommendations are correlated. DGL find evidence of a statistically significant but weak 




economic relation for their earlier time period. Appendix Table A6 (Panel A) reports results 
from a logit model where the dependent variable (Proxy recommendation) equals 1 if ISS 
recommends in favor of a management proposal, 0 otherwise. A one unit downgrade is 
associated with a 0.01 decrease in the probability of a favorable recommendation. The marginal 
effect is statistically significant but of small economic magnitude, given that the sample 
probability of a favorable recommendation is more than 90%. As an additional test, we employ 
the proportion of votes voted in favour of management (Voting outcome) as the dependent 
variable. The results (Appendix Table A6 Panel B) are similar to those for proxy 
recommendations. Rating downgrades thus contain low incremental information about the 
likelihood of subsequent proxy recommendations and voting outcomes, and these subsequent 
outcomes appear unable to explain the negative returns to downgrades.  
3.6 Robustness Tests 
We verify the robustness of our key finding, that ISS downgrades contain price-relevant 
information, by using alternative methodologies. Appendix Table A7 shows that our main 
results are robust to controlling for cross-sectional correlation using the crude dependence 
adjustment method of Brown and Warner (1980), and feasible generalised least squares. 
Appendix Table A8 reports downgrade returns during the proxy season. Large downgrades 
are associated with insignificant positive returns, and larger downgrades are not associated with 
more negative returns. These insignificant results are consistent with rating announcements 
during proxy season being announced earlier with the ISS proxy report. Table A9 shows that 
our main results for upgrades and downgrades are robust to including announcements made 
during proxy season.  
Appendix Table A10 shows that the results are robust to: other sample selection choices; an 
event window of five days around announcement [–2, +2]; different counterfactuals (market 
adjusted, size adjusted, and Fama-French-Carhart model (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 




1997)); winsorization of CAR; exclusion of the financial crisis (defined as August 2008–March 
2009 following Lins et al., 2013);  firm fixed effects; differentiating CGQ Index from QS; 
employing CGQ Industry rather than CGQ Index; exclusion of CGQ changes after February 
2010 (announcement date of transition to GRID). 
Appendix Table A11 (Panel A) shows that downgrades in the ISS GRID rating also contain 
information content, and thus their exclusion does not alter our conclusions. The governance 
categories (compensation, board, shareholder rights, and audit) follow a 1–3 scale which 
necessitates a univariate approach due to an insufficient number of two unit downgrades. 
Compensation downgrades are associated with statistically and economically significant 
negative returns. Downgrade effects for other categories are mixed. Mean returns are 
insignificant throughout whilst median returns are of economic and statistical significance for 
board downgrades. Interpretation of differential impacts by category is complicated by 
observations containing downgrades in multiple categories. Panels B and C report returns for 
the sub-categories of CGQ and QS. For CGQ, downgrades in compensation and shareholder 
rights (not board and audit) are associated with negative returns whilst for QS this holds for all 
categories. 
4. Conclusion 
Over the last 20 years, governance analysts have emerged as important information 
intermediaries in financial markets. Ratings are one of the key services provided and appear to 
be used by practitioners. However, their validity generates divided opinion and the empirical 
literature has produced conflicting results. An important and unresolved question is whether 
ratings provide price relevant information and if so, what the nature of this information is. 
We address this question by examining the price effect of rating announcements. We present 
robust evidence that downgrades by ISS have a large negative impact on stock returns, and thus 
contain information content. The negative returns are consistent with the market revising 




downward its expectation of firm performance due to unexpected lower governance quality as 
conveyed by downgrades. Consistent with this interpretation, returns are decreasing in potential 
agency costs.  We rule out a competing explanation that negative returns are caused by higher 
expectations of an ISS proxy recommendation against management, since negative returns hold 
irrespective of closeness to proxy season and for rating analysts that do not provide proxy 
advice. The information content is independent and cannot be explained solely by having 
drawn the market’s attention to prior governance changes, since the negative returns hold for 
firms with no governance change and correlate highly with proprietary information content.  
We demonstrate the importance of corporate governance information intermediaries in 
financial markets. We show that the influence and impact of ISS, the leading intermediary, 
extends beyond proxy recommendations and subsequent voting outcomes. We contribute to 
the regulatory debate on proxy advisory firms, in which ratings have received relatively little 
attention. Our findings suggest that even in the absence of a proxy advisory service, ISS would 
wield considerable influence and thus the substantive issues at the heart of this debate would 
remain.   
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Figure 1. CAR by rating change  
This graph shows CAR by size of ISS rating change, estimated using kernel-weighted local polynomial 
smoothing. The smoother uses the Epanechnikov kernel and the rule-of-thumb bandwidth of Fan and 
Gijbels (1996). The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Rating upgrades (downgrades) 
are winsorized at 7 (–7) due to low observations beyond this size (5 for upgrades; 1 for downgrades). 
We obtain a similar graph by increasing the bandwidth to 2 rather than winsorizing the data. CAR is 
estimated using the market-model for the window [–1, +1] around rating change announcements. 
   





Figure 2. CAR over window [–10, +10] 
The graph shows mean market model CAR in the 10 days before and after ISS rating upgrades and 
downgrades of >2. The sample consists of 581 upgrades and 340 downgrades.  
 
 




Table 1. Corporate governance ratings 
This table reports summary information on the commercial governance ratings employed.  





Rating CGQ GRID QS AGR GMI TCL 
Years in operation 2002–2010 2010–2012 2013– 2002– 2000–2010 2002–2010 
“Tick-the-box” approach Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Absolute or relative Relative Absolute Relative Relative Relative Absolute 
Overall measure Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governance sub-categories Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rating scale 0–100 Low-medium-
high concern 
1–10 0–100 0–10 A–D, F 
Minimum change 0.01 1 category 1 1 0.5 1 letter 
Strongest governance score 100 Low 1 100 10 A 
Reporting frequency Monthly Monthly Monthly Unsystematic Quarterly Unsystematic 
Firms covered  Russell 3000 and 
2,400 non-Russell 
3000 firms 
Russell 3000 Russell 3000 Russell 3000 and 
6,000 non-Russell 
3000 firms 
Russell 1000 Russell 3000 




Table 2. Sample selection  
This table reports the sample selection process. Incorrect changes are those for which the Bloomberg data is incorrect. Confounding changes are those for which 
CGQ Index is upgraded on the same date that CGQ Industry is downgraded (or vice versa). Confounding announcements occur 10 days either side of the 
announcement date. Missing returns on CRSP are changes with less than 70 daily observations in the estimation period for stock returns (days –270 to –21). 
Rating changes in prior 30 days are changes preceded by a rating change by another governance analyst in the prior 30 trading days.  
 ISS sample  Replication sample 
 CGQ  QS All  AGR CGQ  GMI TCL 
Sample years 2005–2010 2013–2016 2005–2016  2002–2007 2005–2007 2005–2007 2003–2006 
# Ratings 126,689 57,378 184,067  65,152 58,689 10,259 6,488 
Ratings with prior rating available  122,973 53,807 176,780  61,208 55,369 8,698 4,025 
minus Ratings with no change  25,905 40,969 66,874  3,365 7,156 5,708 23 
# Rating changes  97,068 12,838 109,906  57,483 48,213 2,990 4,002 
minus Incorrect changes  0 0 0  0 0 3 0 
minus Confounding changes 27,571 0 27,571  0 10,427 0 0 
minus Confounding announcements 38,066 9,157 47,223  21,707 20,072 1,983 2,781 
- M&A 3,005 693 3,698  2,154 1,729 188 244 
- Earnings 2,978 769 3,747  289 1,737 127 145 
- Dividends 5,206 1,591 6,797  2,288 3,113 256 374 
- Analyst recommendations  12,940 2,576 15,516  9,719 6,553 724 1,066 
- Analyst forecasts 12,710 3,375 16,085  7,060 6,546 651 922 
- Credit ratings changes 68 9 77  106 25 13 4 
- Management changes 521 68 589  91 51 5 10 
- Board changes 638 76 714  0 318 19 16 
minus Missing returns on CRSP 3,791 156 3,947  5,198 2,107 26 70 
minus Stock price < $1 1,451 23 1,474  573 436 2 4 
minus Rating changes in prior 30 days 8,606 350 8,956  10,856 5,525 812 390 
minus Rating changes in proxy season 1,393 431 1,824  0 909 0 0 
# Rating changes after exclusions 16,190 2,721 18,911  19,509 8,300 166 757 
# Unique firms with rating changes 3,698 3,094 4,497  3,782 3,279 1,332 1,495 
# Unique firms with rating changes after exclusions 3,091 1,704 3,616  3,204 2,481 154 579 




Table 3. Summary statistics  
This table reports summary statistics for firm-level variables. Panel A reports statistics for the sample 
of ISS rating changes, Panel B for the replication sample. Both samples are after exclusions in Table 2. 
The number of observations varies because of data availability. All independent variables (except 
Rating change, Upgrade, and Downgrade variables) are winsorized at 1% and 99%, and are defined in 
Section 2. CAR is estimated using the market-model for the window [–1, +1] around rating change 
announcements. 






Panel A: ISS sample 
CAR  18,911 0.09 5.86 –2.22 –0.14 1.98 
Rating change 18,911 0.04 0.98 –0.12 –0.04 0.02 
Upgrade 5,479 0.88 1.17 0.04 0.42 1.00 
Downgrade 13,432 0.31 0.63 0.03 0.07 0.21 
Public content 1,360 0.47 1.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Weighted content 1,360 0.46 0.68 0.00 0.15 0.89 
Discretionary content 1,360 0.37 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.64 
Size (log) 15,412 19.35 1.75 18.07 19.35 20.58 
Free cash flow 12,016 –0.03 0.22 –0.04 0.03 0.07 
Leverage 15,260 0.19 0.21 0.01 0.13 0.30 
MTB 15,521 2.72 6.00 1.16 1.82 3.09 
Volatility  18,839 3.15 1.84 1.87 2.71 3.93 
Institutional ownership 18,911 34.73 35.22 0.00 25.04 67.01 
Panel B: Replication sample  
CAR  28,732 0.23 5.18 –1.75 –0.01 1.89 
AGR Rating change 19,509 0.02 11.23 –6.00 1.00 6.00 
AGR Upgrade 9,876 8.37 7.23 3.00 6.00 11.00 
AGR Downgrade 9,633 8.53 7.58 3.00 6.00 12.00 
CGQ Rating change 8,300 –0.08 6.59 –1.30 –0.60 –0.20 
CGQ Upgrade 1,361 8.10 11.26 1.20 4.08 9.92 
CGQ Downgrade 6,939 1.68 3.37 0.40 0.80 1.60 
GMI Rating change 166 0.13 0.66 –0.50 0.50 0.50 
GMI Upgrade 96 0.64 0.32 0.50 0.50 0.50 
GMI Downgrade 70 0.56 0.22 0.50 0.50 0.50 
TCL Rating change 757 –0.18 1.21 –1.00 –1.00 1.00 
TCL Upgrade 330 1.12 0.34 1.00 1.00 1.00 








Table 4. ISS rating changes and CAR 
This table reports CAR for the [–1, +1] window around ISS rating change announcements. CAR is estimated using the market-model. The sample period is 
2005–2016 and is after exclusions in Table 2. The t-statistics in Panel A account for event-induced change in volatility and cross-sectional correlation in 
abnormal returns (Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010). The generalized sign test follows Cowan (1992). Panel B presents results from regressions of CAR on the size 
of upgrade (Upgrade) for the upgrade sample (columns 1–4), and on the size of downgrade (Downgrade) for the downgrade sample (columns 5–8). Standard 
errors in Panel B are clustered by event date and firm. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 48 industry classification. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
 All  ≥1 >1 >2 All  ≥1 >1 >2 
Mean CAR 0.0109 –0.0219 0.0224 –0.0400 0.1215 –0.2586** –0.7013*** –1.1405*** 
t-test (–0.2128) (–1.4737) (–0.6704) (–0.6703) (0.1257) (–2.3129) (–3.0813) (–3.0801) 
Median CAR –0.1658 –0.1386 –0.1174 –0.0627 –0.1308 –0.2589** –0.4498*** –0.7738*** 
Generalized sign test (–0.4190) (–0.3970) (0.0130) (0.7530) (0.0250) (–2.1160) (–3.1420) (–3.7270) 
         
Event dates 68 65 64 59 69 62 59 44 
Observations 5,479 2,206 1,325 581 13,432 1,775 737 340 
Panel B: Regression analysis  
 All  All  ≥1 ≥1 All  All  ≥1 ≥1 
DepVar: CAR  0.0012 0.0208 0.0376 0.0356 –0.3659*** –0.4708*** –0.4334*** –0.3778*** 
 (0.0876) (0.0845) (0.0793) (0.0853) (0.1193) (0.1418) (0.1632) (0.1242) 
         
Calendar year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.0000 0.0180 0.0001 0.0455 0.0016 0.0141 0.0086 0.0611 
Event dates 68 68 65 65 69 69 62 62 
Observations 5,479 5,479 2,206 2,206 13,432 13,432 1,775 1,775 
 
 




Table 5. ISS rating changes, CAR, and firm characteristics  
This table reports the regression of CAR for the [–1, +1] window around ISS rating change announcements on proxies for agency cost. CAR is estimated using 
the market-model. The sample period is 2005–2016. Definition of variables is provided in Section 2. The sample employed is after the exclusions in Table 2. 
Standard errors are clustered by event date and firm. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 48 industry classification. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
 All  All  ≥1 ≥1 All  All  ≥1 ≥1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Free cash flow 0.9764 1.2451* –0.4573 –0.9026 –0.3253 –0.7218 –2.1012* –2.1374** 
 (0.7793) (0.6588) (1.2234) (1.1844) (0.6927) (0.5535) (1.1308) (0.9668) 
MTB –0.0179 –0.0135 0.0067 0.0156 0.0063 0.0119 0.0274* 0.0259* 
 (0.0119) (0.0112) (0.0125) (0.0104) (0.0111) (0.0104) (0.0151) (0.0154) 
Leverage –0.8036* –0.5152 –0.8625** –0.9446** 0.1963 0.3039 0.6233 0.5603 
 (0.4258) (0.5231) (0.4246) (0.4717) (0.3802) (0.4323) (0.5333) (0.5353) 
Volatility 0.2286** 0.1156 0.3605 0.0575 –0.0338 –0.1668** –0.3167* –0.5487*** 
 (0.1158) (0.0780) (0.2324) (0.1944) (0.1252) (0.0737) (0.1700) (0.1080) 
Size (log) 0.1089 –0.0382 0.2224 0.1074 –0.0767 –0.1131** 0.1539 –0.0699 
 (0.1154) (0.1024) (0.1441) (0.1079) (0.0866) (0.0545) (0.1490) (0.1369) 
Institutional ownership –0.0009 0.0053 –0.0001 0.0033 0.0003 –0.0016 0.0020 0.0089 
 (0.0057) (0.0046) (0.0056) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0058) (0.0061) 
         
Calendar year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.0063 0.0318 0.0136 0.0762 0.0007 0.0157 0.0247 0.0973 
Event dates 68 68 64 64 68 68 56 56 








Table 6. Replication of DGL  
This table replicates the analysis of DGL. We report regressions of CAR for the [–1, +1] window around 
rating change announcements on Rating change which comprises positive values for upgrades and 
negative values for downgrades. The sample period is 2002–2007. In Panel B (C), the sample is before 
(after) exclusions in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by event date. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 AGR CGQ  GMI TCL 
Panel A: DGL analysis  
DepVar: CAR market-adjusted 0.0036 0.0076 –0.0350** 0.1506 
 (0.0029) (0.0044) (0.0145) (0.1319) 
DepVar: CAR size-adjusted 0.0028 0.0069** –0.0270 0.1535 
 (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0202) (0.1146) 
     
Event dates 668 18 8 206 
Observations Not reported Not reported Not reported Not reported 
Panel B: Replication  
DepVar: CAR market-adjusted 0.0028 0.0097 –0.0279* 0.1483 
 (0.0021) (0.0074) (0.0132) (0.1236) 
DepVar: CAR size-adjusted 0.0024 0.0073* –0.0229 0.1404 
 (0.0021) (0.0041) (0.0195) (0.1045) 
     
Event dates 724 19 8 195 
Observations 52,927 45,476 2,961 3,927 
Panel C: Replication after exclusion 
DepVar: CAR market-adjusted 0.0060** –0.0008 –0.2478 0.0976 
 (0.0028) (0.0043) (0.1665) (0.1437) 
DepVar: CAR size-adjusted 0.0053** –0.0012 –0.2173 0.0782 
 (0.0025) (0.0035) (0.1972) (0.1283) 
     
Event dates 401 19 6 195 
Observations 19,509 8,300 166 757 




Table 7. Replication of DGL: upgrades and downgrades 
This table replicates the analysis of DGL. We report regressions of CAR for the [–1, +1] window around rating change announcements on Upgrade for the 
upgrade sample, and on Downgrade for the downgrade sample. The sample period is 2002–2007. In Panel A (B), the sample is before (after) exclusions in 
Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by event date and firm, and a wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure is used when the number of clusters is ≤ 20 (Cameron et 
al., 2008). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Upgrades Downgrades 
 AGR CGQ  GMI TCL AGR CGQ  GMI TCL 
Panel A: Before exclusion  
DepVar: CAR market-adjusted 0.0009 0.0052 0.1428 –0.1753 –0.0030 –0.0253* –0.2127 –0.8847** 
 (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.2570) (0.3025) (0.0053) (0.0153) (1.0670) (0.3991) 
DepVar: CAR size-adjusted 0.0020 0.0008 0.0700 –0.0257 –0.0020 –0.0150** –0.1941 –0.8168** 
 (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.2260) (0.2606) (0.0046) (0.0076) (1.4990) (0.3863) 
DepVar: CAR market model 0.0016 0.0020 0.0426 –0.1342 –0.0043 –0.0246** –0.1799 –0.8206** 
 (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.5470) (0.2412) (0.0052) (0.0121) (0.9570) (0.3709) 
DepVar: CAR Fama-French-Carhart 0.0050 0.0004 0.0320 –0.0500 –0.0024 –0.0203*** –0.2490 –0.7575** 
 (0.0044) (0.0054) (0.2520) (0.1669) (0.0045) (0.0074) (0.8400) (0.3411) 
         
Event dates 420 19 6 110 417 19 6 174 
Observations 26,863 14,874 1,623 1,818 25,829 30,591 1,332 2,109 
Panel B: After exclusion  
DepVar: CAR market-adjusted 0.0099* 0.0014 –0.3383 0.1589 –0.0140 –0.0178* 0.9766 –1.0024*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0095) (2.2900) (0.4365) (0.0088) (0.0100) (1.6380) (0.2433) 
DepVar: CAR size-adjusted 0.0087** –0.0069 –0.5135 0.2585 –0.0145* –0.0038 0.9516 –0.9384*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0076) (1.2530) (0.3681) (0.0081) (0.0060) (1.6080) (0.2433) 
DepVar: CAR market model 0.0111** –0.0070 –0.4172 0.0744 –0.0153* –0.0251** 1.0416 –0.8825*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0111) (0.9850) (0.3980) (0.0080) (0.0102) (1.8900) (0.2638) 
DepVar: CAR Fama-French-Carhart 0.0117** –0.0084 –0.5645 0.0501 –0.0131* –0.0200*** 0.9608 –0.7358*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0113) (1.6440) (0.3344) (0.0077) (0.0075) (1.0830) (0.2465) 
         
Event dates 232 17 5 34 249 19 6 49 
Observations 9,876 1,361 96 330 9,633 6,939 70 427 




Table 8. ISS downgrades, CAR, and prior changes in corporate governance 
This table reports CAR for the [–1, +1] window around ISS downgrade announcements. CAR is estimated using the market-model. The sample period is 2005–
2016. Results are reported according to whether the event firm undergoes a change in corporate governance in the year prior to downgrade announcement. The 
definition is provided in Section 2. The sample employed is after exclusions described in Table 2. The t-statistics in Panel A account for event-induced changes 
in volatility and cross-sectional correlation in abnormal returns (Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010). The generalized sign test follows Cowan (1992). Panel B presents 
results from a regression of CAR on Downgrade. Standard errors in Panel B are clustered by event date and firm. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-
French 48 industry classification. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 No prior change in corporate governance  Prior change in corporate governance 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
Downgrades All  ≥1 >1 >2 All  ≥1 >1 >2 
Mean CAR 0.1141 –0.4913** –1.0827*** –1.4402** 0.1269 –0.1582 –0.4553 –0.9038** 
t-test (0.2049) (–2.4811) (–3.2438) (–2.3989) (0.0407) (–1.5318) (–1.6010) (–2.1654) 
Median CAR –0.1855 –0.4068** –0.4922*** –0.4950** –0.0993 –0.1835 –0.4166* –1.1645*** 
Generalized sign test (–0.9160) (–2.4220) (–2.7760) (–2.4730) (0.8210) (–0.9410) (–1.8010) (–2.7890) 
         
Event dates 66 56 49 36 57 47 44 32 
Observations 5,718 535 289 150 7,714 1,240 448 190 
Panel B: Regression analysis 
Downgrades All  All  ≥1 ≥1 All  All  ≥1 ≥1 
DepVar: CAR –0.4316*** –0.5766*** –0.4870** –0.3947* –0.3199** –0.4009* –0.3662 –0.3644** 
 (0.1367) (0.1225) (0.2202) (0.2203) (0.1573) (0.2081) (0.2254) (0.1517) 
 
Calendar year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.0023 0.0208 0.0165 0.1206 0.0011 0.0159 0.0047 0.0592 
Event dates 66 66 56 56 57 57 47 47 
Observations 5,718 5,718 535 535 7,714 7,714 1,240 1,240 




Table 9. ISS downgrades, CAR, and information content  
This table reports the regression of CAR for the [–1, +1] window around ISS downgrade announcements 
on proxies for information content. CAR is estimated using the market-model. The sample period is 
2013–2016. Public content is the monthly change in the number of governance inputs for which a firm 
meets the ISS criteria. Weighted content is the fitted value of the regression of monthly rating change 
on the monthly changes in individual governance inputs. Discretionary content is the residual from this 
regression. The sample employed is after exclusions in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by event 
date and firm. Industry effects are based on Fama-French 48 industry classification. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
Public content –0.0550 –0.1023** 
 (0.0484) (0.0465) 
Weighted content 0.1623 0.0297 
 (0.1949) (0.2007) 
Discretionary content –0.5077*** –0.5190*** 
 (0.1422) (0.1778) 
   
Calendar year FE No Yes 
Industry FE  No Yes 
R2 0.0125 0.0694 
Event dates 29 29 









Table A1. Examples of institutional shareholders using ISS ratings to monitor boards  
Letter from Groveland 
Capital to the board 
of Biglari Holdings 
(01/22/2015) 
“We believe that good corporate governance practices can drive 
significant value to all shareholders, as well as accrue to the benefit of 
management over the long-term. In this regard, we are concerned that 
board practices of Biglari Holdings Inc. have ranked at the bottom of the 
possible range of the ISS Governance Quickscore, and that ISS has 
commented repeatedly on the outsized CEO compensation not being in 
alignment with company performance. So, we are proposing a corporate 
governance reform plan to the Board of Directors. Specifically, we 
believe the Board should implement the following actions as soon as 
possible.” 
Letter from Mustang 




“Over the last few years we have grown increasingly concerned and 
frustrated by what we believe to be the current Board of Directors' many 
failures.  The Board has not held management accountable for failing to 
meet earnings and revenue guidance by an alarmingly large margin in 
each of the last two years. It has failed to reward stockholders for their 
patience during the multi-year “Orange Way” turnaround. It failed to 
establish an effective incentive plan. It failed to have a management 
succession plan in place. And it has failed to improve egregious 
governance and compensation practices. We believe that these factors 
have caused Furmanite to persistently underperform its only publicly 
traded peer, Team, Inc.…In its 2014 report, ISS gave Furmanite a 
governance Quickscore of 9 overall and 10 in its shareholder rights 
category, indicating the highest levels of concern and governance risk. 
We feel ISS's lack of support for the current Board speaks volumes.” 
Letter from Lone Star 
Value to the 
shareholders of Enzo 
Biochem (12/22/2015) 
 
“We believe change at Enzo is warranted and necessary as a result of:… 
Poor corporate governance and disregard for shareholder rights:…ISS has 
given Enzo a corporate governance Quickscore rating of 10, which is the 
worst possible corporate governance rating that a company can receive 
by ISS…In LSV's conversations with Enzo's CFO, Barry Weiner, in 
response to our call for Enzo to hold a shareholder vote to declassify the 
Board, Mr. Weiner responded that “shareholders don't understand the 
benefits of a classified board and that shareholders don't have enough 
information to make a fully informed decision”…Mr. Weiner's comments 
show a blatant lack of respect for shareholders and a paternalistic attitude. 
Furthermore, when asked about Enzo's extremely poor ISS score, Mr. 
Weiner exclaimed it was because “Enzo does not subscribe to or pay 
for ISS' services”…demonstrating the Company's flippancy toward its 
shareholder-unfriendly corporate governance policies.” 
Marathon Partners 
Calls for Change at 
OnDeck (Dow Jones 
Institutional News, 
04/13/2017) 
“Marathon Partners is also disappointed with OnDeck's corporate 
governance and executive compensation practices, as exemplified 
by ISS's Governance Quickscore of 10 - indicating the highest level of 
concern - at the 2016 Annual Meeting.”  
  




Table A2. Replication of DGL: descriptive statistics  
This table reports descriptive statistics for the rating changes employed in our replication sample and for the DGL sample.  
 Our sample  DGL sample  
 AGR CGQ  GMI TCL AGR CGQ  GMI TCL 
Mean –0.13 0.12 0.04 –0.11 –0.13 0.15 0.04 –0.19 
Standard deviation 11.22 6.45 2.51 1.19 11.02 7.70 2.43 1.19 
10th percentile –13.00 –3.70 –0.50 –1.00 –13.00 –4.29 –0.50 –1.00 
25th percentile –6.00 –1.20 –0.50 –1.00 –6.00 –1.30 –0.50 –1.00 
50th percentile 1.00 –0.40 0.50 –1.00 1.00 –0.40 0.50 –1.00 
75th percentile 6.00 0.30 0.50 1.00 6.00 0.42 0.50 1.00 
90th percentile 13.00 3.26 1.00 1.00 13.00 4.57 1.00 1.00 
Observations 53,608 45,602 2,961 3,927   Not reported   Not reported   Not reported   Not reported 
 
  




Table A3. Replication of DGL: results for alternative event windows  
This table replicates the analysis of DGL. We report regressions of CAR on Rating change which comprises positive values for upgrades and negative values 
for downgrades. We examine two additional windows around the announcement as in DGL: the 5-day window [–2, +2] and the window from the prior rating 
until the current one [prior rating, +1]. The sample period is 2002–2007. The sample employed is before exclusions in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by 
event date. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Our analysis DGL analysis 
 AGR CGQ  GMI TCL AGR CGQ  GMI TCL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DepVar: CAR market-adjusted [–2, +2] 0.0037 0.0029 –0.0055 0.3064*** 0.0048 0.0050 –0.0150 0.3328*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0063) (0.0124) (0.1146) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0114) (0.1190) 
DepVar: CAR size-adjusted [–2, +2] 0.0037 0.0029 0.0077 0.2634*** 0.0044 0.0051 0.0003 0.3173*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0055) (0.0205) (0.0962) (0.0032) (0.0042) (0.0126) (0.1096) 
DepVar: CAR market-adjusted [prior rating, +1] 0.0166 –0.0118 0.0868 –0.1978 0.0287 –0.0182 –0.0910 –0.3846 
 (0.0121) (0.0112) (0.1315) (0.4966) (0.0154) (0.0108) (0.1118) (0.7423) 
DepVar: CAR size-adjusted [prior rating, +1] 0.0188 –0.0075 –0.1174 –0.8061 0.0307** –0.0013 –0.0644 0.1303 
 (0.0118) (0.0355) (0.1330) (0.6010) (0.0144) (0.0110) (0.0983) (0.5173) 
         
Event dates 724 19 8 195 668 18 8 206 
















Table A4. Replication of DGL: AGR upgrades and downgrades by risk category 
This table reports regressions of CAR for the [–1, +1] window around rating change announcements on 
Upgrade for the upgrade sample and on Downgrade for the downgrade sample. The sample of ratings 
employed is after exclusions in Table 2. We select only AGR changes that cause a change from one 
AGR risk category to another. The four categories are: Very Aggressive (bottom 10%), Aggressive (next 
25%), Average (next 50%) and Conservative (top 15%). Standard errors are clustered by event date and 
firm. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
 (1) (2) 
DepVar: CAR market-adjusted 0.0241 –0.0179 
 (0.0263) (0.0115) 
DepVar: CAR size-adjusted 0.0210 –0.0138 
 (0.0238) (0.0119) 
DepVar: CAR market-model 0.0177 –0.0209** 
 (0.0247) (0.0106) 
DepVar: CAR Fama-French-Carhart  0.0069 –0.0213* 
 (0.0241) (0.0120) 
   
Event dates 43 45 
Observations 584 639 




Table A5. ISS downgrades, CAR, and closeness to proxy season 
This table reports CAR for the [–1, +1] window around ISS downgrade announcements. CAR is estimated using the market-model for 2005–2016. Results are 
reported according to whether the downgrade occurs in the quarter prior to proxy season, or prior to this quarter but since the last proxy season. The sample 
employed is after exclusions described in Table 2. The t-statistics in Panel A account for event-induced changes in volatility and cross-sectional correlation in 
abnormal returns (Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010). The generalized sign test follows Cowan (1992). Panel B presents results from a regression of CAR on 
Downgrade. Standard errors in Panel B are clustered by event date and firm. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 48 industry classification. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 >1 quarter before the proxy season ≤ 1 quarter before the proxy season 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
Downgrades All  ≥1 >1 >2 All  ≥1 >1 >2 
Mean CAR 0.0733 –0.2894** –0.6697*** –1.1235*** 0.2687 –0.1095 –0.9048** –1.3035** 
t-test (0.0306) (–2.3635) (–2.6309) (–2.6206) (0.2628) (–0.8469) (–2.2635) (–2.0804) 
Median CAR –0.1234 –0.2418** –0.4066** –0.6830*** –0.1591 –0.2760 –0.6270* –1.0539** 
Generalized sign test (0.3490) (–1.9890) (–2.4280) (–3.1640) (–0.3510) (–1.1750) (–1.8310) (–2.0000) 
         
Event dates 68 60 57 42 61 39 26 13 
Observations 10,122 1,471 638 308 3,310 304 99 32 
Panel B: Regression analysis 
Downgrades All  All  ≥1 ≥1 All  All  ≥1 ≥1 
DepVar: CAR  –0.3598*** –0.4220*** –0.4392** –0.3844*** –0.3395 –0.4639* –0.3800 –0.4217 
 (0.1280) (0.1531) (0.1777) (0.1471) (0.2252) (0.2748) (0.2914) (0.2879) 
 
Calendar year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.0016 0.0118 0.0088 0.0678 0.0009 0.0539 0.0065 0.2253 
Event dates 68 68 60 60 61 61 39 39 
Observations 10,122 10,122 1,471 1,471 3,310 3,310 304 304 
 




Table A6. ISS rating changes, proxy recommendations, and voting outcomes 
This table analyses the relationship between ISS rating changes and subsequent proxy recommendations 
and voting outcomes. Panel A reports logit regressions where the dependent variable equals one if ISS 
recommends in favor of a management proposal. Panel B reports Tobit regressions (with bounds at zero 
and one) where the dependent variable is the numbers of votes for a management proposal divided by 
the sum of votes for, against, and abstentions. The independent variable is Upgrade for the upgrade 
sample and Downgrade for the downgrade sample. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
 (1) (2) 
Panel A: Dependent variable: proxy recommendation in favor of management = 1, 0 otherwise   
Upgrade 0.1737***  
 (0.0389)  
Downgrade  –0.0626** 
  (0.0288) 
   
Marginal effect of rating change 0.0126 –0.0065 
Observations 36,133 30,235 
Panel B: Dependent variable: % of votes for management proposal  
Upgrade 0.0021***  
 (0.0004)  
Downgrade  –0.0035*** 
  (0.0010) 
   
Observations 35,283 29,605 
 




Table A7. ISS rating changes and CAR: Brown and Warner (1980) standard errors and feasible generalized least squares 
This table reports CAR for the [–1, +1] window around ISS rating change announcements. CAR is estimated using the market-model. The sample period is 
2005–2016. The sample employed is after exclusions described in Table 2. The t-statistics in Panel A are calculated using the crude dependence adjustment test 
of Brown and Warner (1980) which estimates the standard deviation of CAR from the time series of average abnormal returns in the estimation period (–270, 
–21). Panel B presents results from a regression of CAR on Upgrade for the upgrade sample, and on Downgrade for the downgrade sample. Standard errors in 
Panel B are estimated using feasible generalised least squares which accounts for contemporaneous cross-correlations. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-
French 48 industry classification. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
 All  ≥1 >1 >2 All  ≥1 >1 >2 
Mean CAR 0.0109 –0.0219 0.0224 –0.0400 0.1215 –0.2586 –0.7013** –1.1405** 
t-test (0.1700) (–0.0430) (0.1130) (–0.1490) (0.7650) (–1.0420) (–2.0830) (–2.1550) 
         
# Event dates 68 65 64 59 69 62 59 44 
# Obs. 5,479 2,206 1,325 581 13,432 1,775 737 340 
Panel B: Regression analysis 
 All  All  ≥1 ≥1 All  All  ≥1 ≥1 
DepVar: CAR 0.0012 0.0208 0.0376 0.0356 –0.3659*** –0.4708*** –0.4334*** –0.3778*** 
 (0.0505) (0.0550) (0.0806) (0.0862) (0.0651) (0.0795) (0.1318) (0.1455) 
 
Calendar year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.0000 0.0193 0.0001 0.0455 0.0022 0.0149 0.0073 0.0573 
Event dates 68 68 65 65 69 69 62 62 
Observations 5,479 5,479 2,206 2,206 13,432 13,432 1,775 1,775 




Table A8. ISS downgrades and CAR during proxy season  
This table reports CAR for the [–1, +1] window around ISS downgrade announcements made during 
the proxy season. CAR is estimated using the market-model for 2005–2016. The sample employed is 
after exclusions (except the proxy season exclusion) described in Table 2. The t-statistics in Panel A 
account for event-induced changes in volatility and cross-sectional correlation in abnormal returns 
(Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010). The generalized sign test follows Cowan (1992). Panel B presents results 
from a regression of CAR on Downgrade. Standard errors in Panel B are clustered by event date and 
firm. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 48 industry classification. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
 All  ≥1 >1 >2 
Mean CAR 0.5732 0.1322 0.3605 0.3430 
t-test (1.0157) (–0.3386) (0.4184) (–0.2843) 
Median CAR 0.0237* –0.3127 –0.0871 –0.1872 
Generalized sign test (1.7200) (–1.0150) (0.3670) (0.1230) 
 
 
   
Event dates 61 49 42 33 
Observations 1,146 392 235 111 
Panel B: Regression analysis 
 All  All  ≥1 ≥1 
DepVar: CAR –0.1943 –0.1300 0.1048 –0.0511 
 (0.1878) (0.2314) (0.3204) (0.3361) 
 
Calendar year FE No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE  No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.0016 0.0932 0.0008 0.1640 
Event dates 61 61 49 49 
Observations 1,146 1,146 392 392 




Table A9. ISS rating changes and CAR including proxy season observations 
This table reports CAR for the [–1, +1] window around ISS rating change announcements. CAR is estimated using the market-model. The sample period is 
2005–2016. The sample employed is after exclusions (except the proxy season) described in Table 2. The t-statistics in Panel A account for event-induced 
changes in volatility and cross-sectional correlation in abnormal returns (Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010). The generalized sign test follows Cowan (1992). Panel 
B presents results from a regression of CAR on Upgrade for the upgrade sample, and on Downgrade for the downgrade sample. Standard errors in Panel B are 
clustered by event date and firm. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 48 industry classification. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
 All  ≥1 >1 >2 All  ≥1 >1 >2 
Mean CAR 0.0605 0.0576 0.1433 0.1416 0.1570 –0.1879** –0.4446*** –0.7754*** 
t-test (–0.1037) (–1.0584) (–0.1351) (–0.1256) (0.1980) (–2.0769) (–2.7001) (–3.0138) 
Median CAR –0.1254 –0.1065 –0.0970 –0.0585 –0.1212 –0.2649** –0.3951** –0.5588*** 
Generalized sign test (0.2320) (0.0310) (0.5350) (0.7560) (0.5830) (–2.3470) (–2.5550) (–3.1750) 
         
Event dates 68 65 65 61 69 63 61 50 
Observations 6,157 2,604 1,622 730 14,578 2,167 972 451 
Panel B: Regression analysis 
 All  All  ≥1 ≥1 All  All  ≥1 ≥1 
DepVar: CAR 0.0263 0.0564 0.0670 0.0431 –0.2867*** –0.3377*** –0.2914* –0.2768*** 
 (0.0768) (0.0420) (0.0689) (0.0692) (0.0965) (0.1151) (0.1621) (0.0971) 
 
Calendar year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.0000 0.0112 0.0004 0.0355 0.0011 0.0100 0.0043 0.0234 
Event dates 68 68 65 65 69 69 63 63 
Observations 6,157 6,157 2,604 2,604 14,578 14,578 2,167 2,167 
  




Table A10. ISS rating changes and CAR: robustness tests 
This table reports regressions of CAR for the [–1, +1] window around rating change announcements on Upgrade for the upgrade sample and on Downgrade 
for the downgrade sample. CAR is estimated using the market-model. The sample period is 2005–2016. Panels (A)-(I) represent the following robustness tests: 
(A) exclusion decisions in Table 2; (B) event windows; (C) benchmark models; (D) winsorization of CAR; (E) exclusion of the financial crisis (August 2008–
March 2009); (F) inclusion of firm fixed effects; (G) separation of CGQ index and QS; (H) replacement of CGQ Index by CGQ Industry (i.e., results reported 
for changes in CGQ Industry and QS); (I) exclusion of CGQ Index changes announced after February 2010. Standard errors are clustered by event date and 
firm. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
 Upgrade coefficient # Obs. R2 Downgrade coefficient # Obs. R2 
Panel A: Exclusion          
All rating changes before exclusions 0.0166 (0.0476) 23,465 0.0000 –0.1677** (0.0669) 54,675 0.0005 
All rating changes less M&A 0.0053 (0.0478) 22,322 0.0000 –0.1715** (0.0676) 52,144 0.0005 
All rating changes less earnings 0.0083 (0.0484) 22,548 0.0000 –0.1795*** (0.0686) 51,580 0.0006 
All rating changes less dividends 0.0114 (0.0527) 20,628 0.0000 –0.1827** (0.0735) 49,275 0.0005 
All rating changes less analyst recommendations –0.0117 (0.0506) 17,203 0.0000 –0.1914*** (0.0684) 40,448 0.0006 
All rating changes less analyst forecasts 0.0352 (0.0772) 10,935 0.0000 –0.2231*** (0.0794) 27,616 0.0005 
All rating changes less changes in credit ratings 0.0164 (0.0482) 23,354 0.0000 –0.1697** (0.0663) 54,397 0.0005 
All rating changes less management changes 0.0172 (0.0465) 22,691 0.0000 –0.1670** (0.0674) 53,199 0.0005 
All rating changes less board changes 0.0219 (0.0479) 22,533 0.0000 –0.1598** (0.0685) 52,626 0.0005 
All rating changes less stock price < $1 0.0252 (0.0446) 22,910 0.0000 –0.1655** (0.0659) 53,374 0.0006 
All rating changes less rating change in prior 30 days 0.0055 (0.0527) 17,829 0.0000 –0.2029*** (0.0767) 38,020 0.0008 
All rating changes less proxy seasons –0.0143 (0.0605) 18,729 0.0000 –0.2152** (0.0843) 48,724 0.0007 
All rating changes after exclusions except M&A 0.0005 (0.0867) 5,624 0.0000 –0.3679*** (0.1199) 13,781 0.0016 
All rating changes after exclusions except earnings 0.0008 (0.0878) 5,528 0.0000 –0.3595*** (0.1186) 13,563 0.0015 
All rating changes after exclusions except dividends –0.0230 (0.0836) 5,891 0.0000 –0.3553*** (0.1099) 14,285 0.0015 
All rating changes after exclusions except analyst recommendations –0.0397 (0.0886) 5,831 0.0001 –0.3480*** (0.1129) 14,352 0.0015 
All rating changes after exclusions except analyst forecasts –0.0219 (0.0679) 8,134 0.0000 –0.2993*** (0.1101) 19,364 0.0014 
All rating changes after exclusions except changes in credit ratings –0.0006 (0.0874) 5,486 0.0000 –0.3565*** (0.1182) 13,465 0.0015 
All rating changes after exclusions except management changes 0.0109 (0.0894) 5,585 0.0000 –0.3692*** (0.1177) 13,617 0.0016 
All rating changes after exclusions except board changes 0.0003 (0.0878) 5,599 0.0000 –0.3699*** (0.1194) 13,720 0.0016 
All rating changes after exclusions except stock price < $1 0.0383 (0.1060) 5,802 0.0000 –0.3470*** (0.1178) 14,199 0.0012 
All rating changes after exclusions except rating change in prior 30 days 0.0243 (0.0779) 7,459 0.0000 –0.3119*** (0.0998) 20,020 0.0010 




All rating changes after exclusions except proxy seasons 0.0263 (0.0768) 6,157 0.0000 –0.2867*** (0.0965) 14,578 0.0011 
All rating changes after exclusions 0.0012 (0.0876) 5,479 0.0000 –0.3659*** (0.1193) 13,432 0.0016 
Panel B: Event window         
[–2, +2] 0.0134 (0.1140) 5,479 0.0000 –0.5574*** (0.1429) 13,432 0.0023 
Panel C: Benchmark models for 3-day CAR 
Market-model 0.0012 (0.0876) 5,479 0.0000 –0.3659*** (0.1193) 13,432 0.0016 
Market-adjusted  –0.0070 (0.0796) 5,479 0.0000 –0.3492*** (0.1321) 13,432 0.0014 
Size-adjusted 0.0233 (0.0717) 5,479 0.0000 –0.2497** (0.1100) 13,432 0.0007 
Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model 0.0094 (0.0692) 5,479 0.0000 –0.2770** (0.1103) 13,432 0.0009 
Panel D: Winsorization of 3-day CAR 
Market-model 0.0120 (0.0778) 5,479 0.0000 –0.3210*** (0.0923) 13,432 0.0019 
Market-adjusted  0.0042 (0.0713) 5,479 0.0000 –0.3141*** (0.1090) 13,432 0.0017 
Size-adjusted 0.0507 (0.0633) 5,479 0.0001 –0.2050** (0.0956) 13,432 0.0008 
Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model 0.0261 (0.0641) 5,479 0.0000 –0.2094*** (0.0808) 13,432 0.0011 
Panel E: Excluding the financial crisis (August 2008–March 2009) 
All rating changes before exclusions –0.0153 (0.0379) 21,691 0.0000 –0.1512*** (0.0625) 52,273 0.0005 
All rating changes after exclusions –0.0088 (0.0570) 4,846 0.0000 –0.2952*** (0.1152) 12,851 0.0012 
Panel F: Firm fixed effects 
All rating changes before exclusions 0.0558 (0.0350) 23,465 0.0055 –0.0886*** (0.0424) 54,675 0.0040 
All rating changes after exclusions 0.0076 (0.0860) 5,479 0.0000 –0.4973*** (0.0792) 13,432 0.0016 
Panel G: Results for CGQ Index and QS separately         
CGQ Index changes after exclusions 0.0581 (0.1060) 4,118 0.0001 –0.4576** (0.1829) 12,072 0.0012 
QS changes after exclusions –0.0403 (0.0746) 1,361 0.0001 –0.4211*** (0.1236) 1,360 0.0098 
Panel H: CGQ Industry rather than CGQ Index 
All rating changes before exclusions –0.0154 (0.0564) 23,465 0.0000 –0.1649*** (0.0772) 54,675 0.0004 
All rating changes after exclusions 0.0245 (0.1003) 5,479 0.0000 –0.3496*** (0.1204) 13,432 0.0012 
Panel I: Excluding CGQ changes after February 2010 
All rating changes before exclusions 0.0024 (0.0497) 22,511 0.0000 –0.1781*** (0.0673) 52,839 0.0006 
All rating changes after exclusions –0.0157 (0.0893) 5,253 0.0000 –0.4048*** (0.1175) 12,975 0.0019 
 
 




Table A11. ISS downgrades in governance sub-categories and CAR  
This table reports CAR for the [–1, +1] window around ISS announcements of downgrades in the sub-
categories of Compensation, Board, Shareholder rights, and Audit. Panel A reports results for the GRID 
rating (2010–2012), which does not report an overall rating but instead these four separate sub-
categories. We exclude GRID announcements where there is an upgrade in any of the four sub-
categories, and make the same exclusions as in Table 2. Panels B and C report the analogous results for 
the sub-categories of CGQ and QS respectively. CAR is estimated using the market-model. The t-
statistics account for event-induced changes in volatility and cross-sectional correlation in abnormal 
returns (Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010). The generalized sign test follows Cowan (1992). ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Compensation Board Shareholder 
rights 
Audit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: GRID     
Mean CAR –0.8487*** –0.0891 –0.1352 –0.1706 
t-test (–3.5695) (–1.0502) (–0.9229) (–0.3348) 
Median CAR –0.6110*** –0.7139*** –0.5195 –0.7762 
Generalized sign test (–3.8420) (–2.6590) (–1.2800) (–1.1540) 
     
Event dates 187 95 76 60 
Observations 619 252 239 111 
Panel B: CGQ     
Mean CAR –0.9686** –0.2686 –0.8283* 0.2529 
t-test (–1.9762) (–0.7373) (–1.8130) (0.1636) 
Median CAR –0.6967** –0.1915 –0.6058 –0.3089 
Generalized sign test (–2.4330) (–0.1540) (–0.8980) (–0.0650) 
     
Event dates 21 22 23 19 
Observations 221 213 232 151 
Panel C: QS     
Mean CAR –0.3328*** –0.3157* –0.7285* –0.4442 
t-test (–2.5965) (–1.8328) (–1.9207) (–1.5705) 
Median CAR –0.3565* –0.2704 –0.3885* –0.2182 
Generalized sign test (–1.8350) (–1.3930) (–1.9000) (–0.4560) 
     
Event dates 29 28 26 23 
Observations 613 429 159 185 
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